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Experimental implementations of dictator games are found to differ in terms of their 
underlying strategic incentives. We explore this discovery in two separate directions. 
Theoretically, assuming identical other-regarding preferences, we show that the two most 
widely used protocols can generate strongly contrasting rational-choice predictions, from 
which different interpretations of dictator giving arise. Experimentally, a tailor-made 
experiment reveals significant differences between the two protocols but rejects full 
rationality as a satisfactory explanatory theory. Our findings indicate that several previously 
drawn conclusions regarding other-regarding preferences among humans distinguished by 
social class, gender, generation, nationality, etc. may be more ambiguous than hitherto 
believed.
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
‘We take license of calling the dictator game a “game”
although it is a single person decision problem.’
Forsythe et al. (1994)
1. Introduction
In the original formulation of the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994), one person acting in the 
role of a ‘dictator’ decides how to split a pie of fixed size, or, equivalently, how much of his own wealth to redistribute to 
someone else at a one-to-one exchange rate; see Fig. 1a for a stylized illustration. Understanding how individuals behave in 
such situations and why they do so has important implications for explaining human behavior in general, and, in particular, 
for a wide array of giving-contexts such as cooperating, donating, negotiating, helping, etc.
From the perspective of narrow self-interest, a dictator maximizes his material payoff by keeping everything and giving 
nothing. The fact that positive giving is consistently observed in controlled laboratory experiments ever since Kahneman 
* Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: pgrech@ethz.ch (P.D. Grech), heinrich.nax@uzh.ch (H.H. Nax).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.004
0899-8256/ 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Types of Dictator Games. (a) Non-interactive (two players, one dictator): the dictator’s own material payoff depends only on how much he/she keeps, 
and the recipient’s material payoff depends only on how much the dictator gives. (b) Interactive (two players, two dictators): each player is both, the other 
player’s dictator and recipient. (c) Interactive (n players, n dictators): each player is someone’s dictator and someone else’s recipient, etc. - until the ‘loop’ 
closes.
et al. (1986) falsifies the hypothesis that all humans are always narrowly motivated by material self-interest.1 In order to 
move on and measure more precisely how other-regarding (also referred to as distributional, social, altruistic etc.) concerns 
matter beyond narrow self-interest, generalized dictator game experiments have been conducted where the multiplier of 
redistribution is varied meaning that a dictator’s giving may have different worth in the recipient’s hands. Giving decisions 
across a range of thus modified dictator games have been used to calibrate various other-regarding preference types.
Inferring preferences from giving decisions in this way relies on the fundamental assumption that individual actions ac-
curately ‘reveal’ preferences in the sense that all payoff-relevant factors (including beliefs) are expressed (Samuelson, 1938). 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) made a seminal contribution translating methods based on the generalized axiom of revealed 
preferences (GARP) from consumer theory to dictator games, thus proposing a framework to estimate other-regarding pref-
erences based on classical rationality axioms (hence ‘rational altruism’). The key insight of this literature is to interpret 
individual giving as rational decisions driven by individual other-regarding preferences, an approach sometimes subsumed 
under the umbrella of the ‘subjective expected utility correction project’ (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). Andreoni and Miller 
(2002)’s method is widely used (see e.g. Fisman et al. 2007, 2015b,a), prominently to fit utility functions of the constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) family which allow classifications of individuals according to their trade-offs of self-interest 
vs. altruism and of equality vs. efficiency; see Jakiela (2013) for a literature overview.2 Related methods based on different 
functional assumptions regarding utilities include, for example, the classic ‘ring measure’ from social psychology (Liebrand, 
1984; Murphy et al., 2011; Nax et al., 2015), and other other-regarding preferences such as those due to Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002).
All other-regarding preference estimation techniques, whether based on CES utilities or on other preference models, 
rely crucially on a special feature of the dictator game as it was originally formulated (henceforth referred to as the ‘non-
interactive’ dictator game), which is that giving decisions are not interdependent: the dictator is no one’s recipient and the 
recipient is no one’s dictator (as illustrated in Fig. 1a). If the decision context is instead strategic, as is the case when a 
player gives and receives at the same time (thus yielding a truly interdependent one-shot game as illustrated in Figs. 1b & 
1c), then giving decisions cannot be disentangled from beliefs regarding others’ giving decisions, and individual preferences 
cannot be inferred in the same way. In such ‘interactive’ dictator games where each player assumes both roles –dictator and 
recipient– at the same time, each player’s total monetary payoff is, on the one hand, determined by the payment he/she 
receives from ‘his/her’ dictator, and, on the other hand, by the amount he/she keeps and does not give to ‘his/her’ recipient. 
Thus, the payoff to any given player is a function of his/her own decision and those of others.3
The key motivation for the present paper was our discovery that many dictator game studies that aim to measure 
preferences have been and continue to be implemented interactively, but are then analyzed within the framework of 
non-interactive dictator games.4 To the best of our knowledge, the implications of such protocol pooling have so far not 
undergone detailed scrutiny in the scholarly literature.5 This is also illustrated by Engel’s extensive (2011) meta-study of 
the dictator game experiments literature which does not differentiate along this dimension. Similarly, Jakiela (2013)’s re-
view of dictator game studies that focuses on measuring other-regarding preferences does not mention this issue either. 
1 See Engel (2011) for an extensive meta-study involving 131 papers.
2 GARP goes back to Samuelson (1938), CES functions to Solow (1956), and preference estimation to Afriat (1967, 1972); see Choi et al. (2007), Polisson 
and Quah (2013), Polisson and Renou (2016) for extensions.
3 Interactive dictator games constitute interesting games in their own right, as they can be used to model situations such as gift exchange or mutual 
help, where the gift one gives or the help one offers to others may explicitly depend on the gift or the help one receives.
4 In fact, the list of interactive implementations doing this includes Andreoni and Miller (2002) itself. Other prominent examples include studies that draw 
conclusions regarding differences in pro-sociality between humans distinguished by factors such as social class (Fisman et al., 2015b), gender (Andreoni 
and Vesterlund, 2001), generation (Cameron et al., 2013), nationality (Ashraf et al., 2006), and more.
5 We are only aware of two experimental results, Greiff et al. (2018), Korenok et al. (2013), which will be discussed below.
P.D. Grech, H.H. Nax / Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020) 309–338 311
However, treating non-interactive and interactive dictator games the same has consequences regarding the interpretation of 
such experiments, in particular regarding the rationality assumptions that pertain to their analysis. While rational-choice 
assumptions allow for other-regarding preference estimation as outlined above under non-interactive protocols, the applica-
bility of such techniques for interactive protocols relies on a rather extreme view of rationality. Concretely, it requires that 
the economic agent is, on the one hand, perfectly rational in terms of pursuing utility-maximization that takes into account 
the welfare of others, while, on the other hand, he/she is perfectly irrational in a strategic sense and unaware that others 
take decisions that are relevant for himself/herself. That is, he/she is highly rational in terms of his/her effect on others’ 
welfare, but entirely unable of any ‘cognitive empathy’ in terms of putting himself/herself in others’ shoes.
If maintained, the kind of strategic unawareness outlined above would either be a natural trait of humans or it would 
have been created by the experimenter, namely if subjects were successfully framed so as to perceive an interactive setting 
as a non-interactive one. The former case conflicts with findings from many other –often more sophisticated– experimental 
games, the latter might violate important principles of experimental economics. Indeed, following Bardsley et al. (2010), 
subjects should be provided with instructions that bring across accurately the true nature of the underlying decision con-
text: a comparison with (theoretical) rational-choice benchmarks of an experimental game becomes meaningful only when 
subjects can reasonably be assumed to have a correct interpretation of the underlying strategic structure. Thus, either all 
payoff consequences of actions ought to be explained to subjects, or, whatever is not being explained ought to be made 
explicit. And indeed, most studies in experimental game theory rely on instructions where a great deal of effort is made to 
make strategic interdependencies explicit (by using matrices, figures, examples, etc., for example, in voluntary contributions 
games, trust games, etc.). All interactive dictator game instructions we are aware of state the interactive nature of the game 
explicitly (with a sentence or two), but without providing further details to make it particularly easy to understand (con-
trols in our experiment, which is based on standard instructions, actually reveal substantial rates of misunderstanding in all 
treatments, cf. Footnote 36 below). As a result, we as analysts can neither be sure that subjects understand the interdepen-
dencies perfectly (and do not play the game as if it was non-interactive), nor that they do not understand them at all (and 
do play as if the game was non-interactive).
If, by contrast, we let go of the assumption of strategic unawareness, the two protocols can no longer be used inter-
changeably, as one of them is non-strategic and the other represents a proper (one-shot) game.6 Thus, beyond preferences 
for selfishness and efficiency, differing degrees of strategic sophistication and awareness then influence the observed giving 
patterns in interactive settings and provide additional confounds. Related to this, Dufwenberg et al. (2011) have shown that 
a similar interpretational ambiguity arises in competitive equilibrium according to which it is generally impossible to infer 
other-regarding preferences from behavior.
The goals of the present paper are twofold. First, we develop standard neoclassical rational-choice benchmarks for an 
interactive dictator game model and compare them with rational giving decisions in non-interactive games.7 This will con-
stitute an analysis of the interactive dictator games’ Nash equilibria where players are characterized by the same kinds 
of other-regarding preferences that are used in non-interactive dictator games. Second, we conduct a tailor-made experi-
ment in order (a) to test for protocol differences between interactive and non-interactive implementations, and, if there are 
differences, (b) to investigate whether rationality benchmarks can explain observed behavior.
Our theory results summarize as follows. In the non-interactive case, rational giving with other-regarding preferences 
predicts that the amount allocated by a dictator to his/her recipient is an intermediate one, unless the individual is nar-
rowly self-interested (perfectly altruistic), in which case he/she gives zero (everything). In the interactive case, the standard 
rational-choice benchmark is Nash equilibrium, which accounts for the fact that giving decisions are interdependent. We 
show that there exist many circumstances under which equilibria are characterized by a bang-bang structure: specifically, if 
players have sufficiently low (high) concerns for others’ payoffs, then zero (full) payments are made. This is true for arbitrary 
assumptions regarding ‘bracketing’ (i.e. how weights are being attached to other players), for (some) incomplete information 
regarding other players’ preferences and experimental parameters, and for an array of alternative other-regarding prefer-
ence specifications (in particular, CES utilities and preference models by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), Charness and Rabin (2002)). Finally, we also show that, under various natural assumptions on players’ bracketing 
and concerns, extremal payments constitute the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These findings enable us to make 
a clear case in point regarding the inferential problem addressed above: zero giving in interactive dictator games cannot
unambiguously be interpreted as extreme selfishness as it may also be strategic play by a substantially altruistic individual. 
Thus, a population sample making zero payments under an interactive design could in principle even be more altruistic 
than another population sample making non-zero payments under a non-interactive protocol. For full disclosure, we point 
out that our specific equilibrium results may be more or less generic depending on the specific interactive protocol being 
used – and we wish to abstain from making any claims other than what we can prove. However, we hope that even the 
skeptical reader can, by virtue of our arguments, appreciate the fact that non-interactive and interactive protocols yield 
different rational-choice benchmarks – and in many cases even quite strikingly so.
6 Hypothetically, if, for any given player, all equilibrium payments in the interactive setting were always exactly identical to his/her decisions in the 
non-interactive setting, the two protocols might be used interchangeably, at least theoretically (less so practically given that subjects are usually not 
perfectly rational). However, we shall see that interactive dictator games generically feature no dominant strategies.
7 ‘Neoclassical’ here simply refers to a utilitarian notion of rationality (allowing other-regarding preferences), see Binmore (2015).
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Fig. 2. Space of CES Utilities. Combinations expressing various other-regarding preferences with respect to the tradeoffs of self-interest versus altruism (c on 
the x-axis) and of equality versus efficiency (ρ on the y-axis).
An experimental investigation of protocol differences complements our theory, providing the basis for additional tests. 
To follow as methodologically clean a test procedure as possible, we pre-committed a complete analysis plan at the Open 
Science Framework (OSF) based on a pre-registered design akin to randomized controlled trials as are standardly used in 
various other disciplines. Our experimental findings summarize as follows. First, we test for protocol differences, and find 
that significant differences exist. This implies that the differing strategic incentives have some –to be understood– effect. 
Second, we derive a set of testable hypotheses from our theoretical results, and by rejecting these establish that standard 
rational-choice assumptions cannot organize the data, even though some of the differences bear traces of interactive play.8
In combination, both our theoretical and experimental results highlight that the determinants of voluntary giving are 
more complex than hitherto assumed and suggest that experimental studies relying on interactive protocols are difficult 
to interpret: taking their (non-interactive) theory part as a given, different experiments seem to be in order, taking their 
(interactive) experimental part as a given, a different theoretical treatment is warranted.9
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Next, we outline the models and present our theory results. In the 
subsequent results sections, we discuss their relevance for dictator game implementations, analyze our own experiment and 
compare our findings with existing data from the literature that uses both non-interactive and interactive implementations. 
Finally, summary and outlook conclude.
2. Model
In this section we introduce utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) representing a wide array 
of distributional preferences, and illustrate how they can be used to model both non-interactive as well as interactive 
dictator games. While we shall work with these specific functional assumptions throughout the main text for the sake 
of presentation, we show that our main results also hold for alternative utility specifications, as will be indicated where 
appropriate (proofs are relegated to Appendix A).
2.1. CES utility functions
CES preferences are frequently used to explain dictator game decisions, and may be written as
v(o, s) :=
[




where c ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1] are two parameters, whose significance will be clarified below.10 For ρ < 0, if s = 0
or o = 0 we define v by left-continuous extension, i.e. v(s, 0) = v(0, o) = v(0, 0) = 0. If ρ = 0 then v is defined as a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function v(o, s) = ocs1−c , which, by the Bernoulli-de-l’Hôpital rule, arises as the pointwise limit of (1)
if c = 0, 1. The terms o, s ≥ 0 denote the final material ‘payoffs’ of self (in the dictating role) and other (in the receiving 
role), respectively.
Fig. 2 illustrates the parameter range of CES utility functions. To provide some intuition for such preferences and how 
they depend on parameters c and ρ , we consider the following limiting cases.
Perfect Egoist. If c = 0, then v(o, s) = s: the player only seeks to maximize his own payoff.
Perfect Altruist. If c = 1, however, v(o, s) = o: the player maximizes the recipients payoff.
Rawlsian. If ρ → −∞ and c = 0, 1 we obtain Leontief utility functions v(o, s) = min{o, s} with L-shaped indifference curves: 
the player seeks equality.
8 The fact that the game theorists who commented on our work thus far were as surprised by our theoretical results as we were, is perhaps an 
indicator that Nash equilibrium predictions are unlikely to be observed when tested with experimental subjects – as is the case with many other one-shot 
experimental games.
9 Results of past studies may still carry truth, in particular if we knew that subjects were strategically unaware – an assumption which is however 
troublesome in its own right as was laid out above.
10 See Jakiela (2013) for a detailed discussion of characteristics and usages of CES preferences.
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Efficiency optimizer. If ρ = 1 and c = 0, 1 the utility function becomes linear, v(o, s) = co + (1 − c)s, so that, in presence of a 
budget constraint, the player is purely efficiency-oriented.
Thus, c measures the player’s concern and guides from self-interest to altruism, while ρ quantifies the player’s efficiency 
orientation ranging from equality-concern to pure efficiency-orientation.
2.2. Non-interactive dictator games
In the standard non-interactive setting, a single dictator possesses a total amount normalized to one (the whole pie), and 
has the option of paying a recipient an arbitrary fraction 0 ≤ π ≤ 1 of this pie. Contingent on this payment, the recipient 
obtains a payoff amounting to pπ , where p > 0 is the ‘multiplier of redistribution’ (the inverse 1/p is also referred to as 
the ‘price of redistribution’). If the dictator has CES preferences, given by Equation (1), where o = pπ and s = (1 − π), his 
utility function can be written as
u(π) :=
[




The dictator determines his optimal giving by maximizing this one-dimensional function u(π).
2.3. Interactive dictator games
In order to introduce the interactive setting, we assume that N players (1, 2, . . . , N) are arranged in a ‘loop’ of size N , 
see Fig. 1c. That is, Player 1 is the dictator of Player 2, who is the dictator of Player 3, . . . , who is the dictator of Player N , 
who is the dictator of Player 1.
Each player initially possesses a total amount of one and may choose –simultaneously to all others– to make a payment 
of 0 ≤ πi ≤ 1 to his/her recipient (i = 1, . . . , N). As in the non-interactive case, this amount is multiplied by p > 0 so that 
Player i obtains an amount pπi−1 from his/her predecessor, Player i −1, in the loop (the predecessor of Player 1 is Player N). 
Hence, Player i’s total payoff consists of what he/she keeps and what he/she receives, amounting to
si := 1− πi + pπi−1.
Next, we want to model how Player i cares for the final payoffs of other players. A canonical assumption, and the 
one we make here, is that Player i –rather than caring about every single other player separately– considers some form 
of aggregation of others’ payoffs as given by a distribution of ‘weightings’ {w(i)
j
} j =i such that w
(i)
j


















(1− π j + pπ j−1).
Different ways to distribute weightings {w(i)j } j =i express various plausible ‘bracketing’ assumptions regarding Player i’s 





for all j = i, which corresponds to a ‘broad’ bracketing in the sense that all other players’ payoffs 
matter equally to Player i. Also plausible would be a ‘narrow’ bracketing with w(i)i+1 = 1 and w
(i)
j = 0 for j = i + 1, where 
Player i considers only his/her immediate recipient (i.e. the direct successor in the loop).12
It then follows that, given a weighting {w(i)
j
} j =i , Player i’s utility in the interactive setting reads as, cf. Equation (1),
































11 We are grateful to the associate editor and a reviewer for suggesting this model and terminology.
12 We thank the associate editor for the observant remark that related bracketing assumptions could actually even matter in non-interactive dictator game 
implementations. Indeed, instead of caring exclusively about one’s ‘own’ recipient, a dictator in a non-interactive setting might care about the distribution 
of payoffs in the game more generally, e.g. by considering the average recipient payoff. The giving decisions of all dictators would then constitute a single 
proper game. Future work should consider this possibility too.
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Importantly, as opposed to the non-interactive case, this expression depends not only on Player i’s own payment decision 
but also on those of other players. We stress that all player make their payment decision at the same time and thus 
without knowing the decisions of others. It follows that we are faced with a proper, i.e. interactive, one-shot/simultaneous 
move game and hence shall be interested in computing its Nash equilibria.
3. Results
In this section, we develop the rational-choice predictions for both types of settings. We first identify the optimal 
payments for non-interactive dictator games. Second, we contrast these predictions with pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
benchmarks under complete information in the interactive setting.
3.1. Non-interactive dictator games
Starting from Equation (2), the utility-maximizing payment π∗ is readily computed (see also Jakiela 2013) from the 














Here, a has the meaning of an efficiency-adjusted selfishness parameter: it is decreasing in c and increasing (decreasing) 




). As a consequence, we obtain the intuitive interpretation that, first, more concern (higher c) 
yields higher payments, and, second, more efficiency orientation (higher ρ) yields lower payments for low redistribution 
multipliers and higher payments for high redistribution multipliers. Equation (4) also shows that the optimal payment is 
increasing in p for ρ > 0, decreasing in p for ρ < 0, and independent of p for ρ = 0.13
The limiting cases of Formula (4) relate to those of v(o, s) that were discussed above as follows.
Perfect egoist. If c = 0, optimal payment is π∗ = 0 for all ρ .
Perfect altruist. If c = 1, optimal payment is π∗ = 1 for all ρ .
Rawlsian. If ρ → −∞ and c = 0, 1, then π∗ = 1
1+p
, and 1 − π∗ = pπ∗: equality adjusted for p.





3.2. Interactive dictator games
Best replies
In order to determine the Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the interactive dictator game, we first compute the best 
reply BRi(π−i), where π−i is shorthand notation for (π1, . . . , πi−1, πi+1, . . . , πN ) for each Player i starting out from his/her 
utility function ui(π1, . . . , πN ), see Equation (3). We present here the analysis of the cases excluding limiting preferences 
discussed above (perfect egoist/altruist, Rawlsian, and efficiency optimizer), which are treated in Appendix A.1. We thus 
assume
0 < ci < 1 and − ∞ = ρi < 1. (5)
For the first order condition for a best reply, it suffices to consider ui(π1, . . . , πN )ρi , even for ρi < 0 (the case 
ui(π1, . . . , πN ) = 0 corresponds to a minimum and can thus be excluded). We obtain






























⇔ si =: aioi, (6)
where all functions are evaluated at (π1, . . . , πi−1, BRi(π−i), πi+1, . . . , πN ). It is readily verified that the Cobb-Douglas 
case, ρi = 0, leads to the same result. Relation (6) has the intuitive interpretation that Player i’s best reply yields higher 
(lower) payoffs for himself than for the weighted average of the others if ai > 1 (ai < 1), where ai is the efficiency-adjusted 
13 The latter observation is consistent with the fact that in a Cobb-Douglas utility function, p only enters as an overall multiplicative constant. It therefore 
has no influence on optimal payment, and the utility-maximizing payment is π∗ = c, independent of the multiplier of redistribution p > 0.
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selfishness parameter in the interactive case, see Equation (4).14 In particular, there are no dominant strategies as long as 
0 < ai < ∞, because the giving constituting a best reply will generically depend on others’ giving.
Nash equilibria: general results
We use the best reply correspondences to compute the Nash equilibria of the N-player interactive dictator game. The 
next theorem is our main result for this case. It establishes that, for a wide range of other-regarding preferences, extremal 
payments constitute Nash equilibria in the interactive setting.
Theorem 1. The N-player interactive dictator game admits the following equilibria (π∗1 , . . . , π
∗











= 1 for all i:
1. If for all i either 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1, or ρi = 1 and w
(i)
i+1pci = (1− ci), then (π
∗
1 , . . . , π
∗
N ) = (1, . . . , 1) is an equilibrium.
2. If for all i either 1 ≤ ai ≤ ∞, or ρi = 1 and w
(i)
i+1pci = (1− ci), then (π
∗
1 , . . . , π
∗
N ) = (0, . . . , 0) is an equilibrium.
This result stands in stark contrast to the non-interactive setting where intermediate payments are made whenever 
0 < a < ∞. The extremal giving structure of Theorem 1 is quite robust with respect to variations of the underlying mod-
eling assumptions. For one, zero payments also emerge in equilibrium with respect to other well-known specifications of 
other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Moreover, 
the same kind of equilibrium structure persists when information regarding other players is modeled as incomplete: for 
instance, provided that beliefs (including higher-orders) attach non-zero probability only to ai ≥ 1, equilibrium payments 
remain zero. For further details, generalizations, as well as for a proof of Theorem 1, the reader is referred to the Ap-
pendix A.
To help gain some intuition for our result, consider Equation (6): if all players are, for instance, sufficiently selfish, 
i.e. if ai > 1 for all i, then any player’s best reply will ensure that others have less final payoff than him/her. Iteratively 
eliminating strictly dominated strategies then leads to the only fixed point in best replies, which is the Nash equilibrium 
with zero-giving for all players.15 Similarly, if instead all players are somewhat altruistic, i.e. if ai < 1 for all i, then an 
analogous argumentation leads to full-giving by all players in equilibrium.
To express our findings in terms of our initial parameters ci , ρi and w
(i)










Note that the condition for zero payments, ci < ccrit , is easier to fulfill the lower the multiplier of redistribution p and the 
smaller the weight w(i)i+1 . An analogous statement can be made if ci > ccrit . From a welfare perspective, this p-dependence 
can thus be seen as an (imperfect) tendency towards efficiency in interactive designs in comparison with non-interactive 
ones. Note however that Condition (7) does not depend at all on the players’ respective efficiency orientations in our 
CES-based model.16 This, again, is opposed to the non-interactive setting.
While the existence of zero-giving equilibria for not purely selfish players in itself already clashes with findings in 
the traditional non-interactive approach, uniqueness of the equilibria described in Theorem 1 can in addition be proved 
depending on the underlying bracketing assumptions. We explicitly analyze the following canonical cases.
Narrow bracketing. In this case w(i)
i+1 = 1 and w
(i)
j






=: cnarrowcrit , (8)
which corresponds to the critical value for monotonicity in ρ in the non-interactive case, cf. Equation (4). The case of narrow 
bracketing also allows us to think about welfare comparison with the non-interactive setting since there the bracketing 
trivially concerns only one subject, i.e. the recipient (however beware the caveat mentioned in Footnote 12). If, for instance, 
we assume ci < ccrit , we may conclude that an interactive implementation is more efficient for p < 1 while a non-interactive 
implementation is for p > 1. An analogous statement can be made if all ci > ccrit .








=: cbroadcrit . (9)
14 We show in Appendix A.1 that most combinations of the excluded parameter choices, specifically ci = 0, 1 and ρi = −∞, 0, 1, can be absorbed by 
values of ai ∈ [0, ∞], so that Equation (6) remains valid. Only the case where ρi = 1 and w(i)i+1pci = (1 − ci) requires a separate treatment.
15 This is equally true for a finite (as encountered in the economic laboratory) and a continuous (as in our theory formulation) strategy space (Chen et al., 
2007).
16 This is even true for the special case ρi = 1 since ci > ccrit (ci < ccrit) is then absorbed in ai = 0 (ai = ∞).
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Thus, ci < cbroadcrit is then satisfied even for substantially altruistic players if p/N is sufficiently small. In particular, we obtain a 
zero-giving equilibrium under broad bracketing as long as the players are not perfectly altruistic and sufficiently numerous.
Under these bracketing assumptions we obtain the following uniqueness result.
Theorem 2. The following statements hold for the N-player interactive dictator game under both narrow and broad bracketing:
1. If 0 ≤ ai < 1 for all i, then (π∗1 , . . . , π
∗
N ) = (1, . . . , 1) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
2. If 1 < ai ≤ ∞ for all i, then (π∗1 , . . . , π
∗
N ) = (0, . . . , 0) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
Nash equilibria: 2-player case
We conclude this section with a detailed discussion of the case N = 2, where a complete description of all pure strategy 
Nash equilibria turns out to be technically feasible. Note that in this case all possible bracketing assumptions coincide.
Proposition 3. For ai ∈ [0, ∞], the pure strategy equilibria (π∗i , π
∗
−i) of the 2-player interactive dictator game can be characterized 
as follows:
1. If aia−i = 1 (generic case) the equilibrium strategy combination is unique and located on the boundary of the unit square [0, 1]2. 
More precisely, we have:
i. If aia−i > 1 and a−i, ai ≥ 1 then (π∗i , π
∗
−i
) = (0, 0).
ii. If aia−i > 1 and a−i > 1 > ai then (π∗i , π
∗
−i
) = ( 1−ai
1+pai
, 0).
iii. If aia−i < 1 and a−i, ai ≤ 1 then (π∗i , π
∗
−i
) = (1, 1).



























3. If ai = 0 and a−i = ∞, the unique equilibrium strategy combination is (π∗i , π
∗
−i
) = (1, 0), consistent with 1.ii and 2.








) is an equilibrium strategy combination. In particular, if 
also ρ−i = 1 and c−i p = 1 − c−i , then any (π∗i , π
∗
−i) is an equilibrium strategy combination.
The proof is given in Appendix A.6. While Theorem 1 and 2 are concerned with the generic extremal payments we 
highlight two special cases of intermediate payments treated in Proposition 3 which are readily generalized to the N-player 
case. First, aia−i = 1 may be observed experimentally, for instance in a basic dictator game (p = 1) where both players value 
their own and other’s payoffs equally (ci = c−i =
1
2
, ρi, ρ−i < 1); in which case ai = a−i = 1. In a non-interactive setting, 
such a dictator would split 50-50. In an interactive setting, however, any split of the pie, as long as both players split it the 




) = (t, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, which is consistent with Item 2 above. Using the 
best reply correspondence, Equation (10) in the Appendix, this equal-payment equilibrium, follows immediately also for an 
arbitrary number of players with such preferences given p = 1.
Second, if in a basic dictator game (p = 1) a player is perfectly efficiency-oriented (ρi = 1), and has as much concern 
for himself/herself as for his opponent (ci = c−i = 12 ), then his/her preferences coincide with those of a social planner who 
aims to maximize total wealth. Thus, the player is indifferent with respect to his/her payment; just as described by Item 4 
above. This is equally true in the N-player setting as long as concerns are modified to account for bracketing weights, 
ci = 1/(1 + w
(i)
i+1), see the efficiency optimizer case discussed in Appendix A.1.
4. Experimental evidence
4.1. Existing studies
Dictator games are one of the fruit flies of experimental economics. Despite fundamental differences that result in terms 
of strategic incentives non-interactive and interactive protocols have been used interchangeably. The pioneering experiments 
by the ‘inventors’, Kahneman et al. (1986) (without monetary incentives) and Forsythe et al. (1994) (with monetary incen-
tives), were completely non-interactive. These studies featured relatively small subject samples, and their main purpose was 
to test the hypothesis that all subjects were narrowly motivated by material self-interest, falsified by the fact that substantial 
percentages of the samples gave positive amounts.
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However, allocating half of the subjects (the recipients) to a purely passive role is extremely unattractive from a cost per-
spective, because those subjects take absolutely no decision and, thus, do not generate any exploitable experimental data.17
Perhaps because of that, many of the more recent experiments –which recruited larger number of subjects, because they 
were designed to go beyond constituting counterexamples against the narrow self-interest hypothesis– opted for interactive 
experimental protocols. This leads to all subjects generating data as everybody then acts as both dictator and recipient at 
the same time, but also comes at the hitherto unacknowledged ‘cost’ of introducing unwanted strategic incentive. Typically, 
and presumably with the intent of making the link between giving and taking less immediately evident, any two subjects 
are precluded from being mutual dictators by virtue of the matching protocol. Instead, ‘loops’ with sizes larger than three 
are being implemented to incentivize decisions (see Fig. 1c).18
As mentioned in the Introduction, existing dictator game studies have to the best of our knowledge not thoroughly 
distinguished between the two implementations, despite the fundamental differences in terms of incentives. No study fol-
lowing an interactive experimental design has considered decision inter-dependencies –neither theoretically by developing 
the rational-choice benchmarks (i.e. Nash equilibrium) nor experimentally by controlling satisfactorily for strategic sophisti-
cation. What is more, we know of only one single study that compared, at least experimentally, the two protocols using a 
randomized between-subject design (Korenok et al., 2013).19 This study, in a relatively small subject sample (N = 57 (non-
interactive) resp. N = 62 (interactive) vs. N = 206 (both treatments) in our experiment), results in no conclusive evidence. 
Furthermore, its main focus is on endowment effects –a parameter which we held fixed in our own experiment to avoid 
further confounds– and an appropriate control for beliefs has been left aside. To be clear, theirs is a perfectly legitimate 
finding, but as we lay out in Appendix B even in this case an interpretational ambiguity persists in view of our theoretical 
findings.
A particularly instructive case that illustrates how our theoretical findings may be relevant is that of Fisman et al. 
(2015b) where coincidentally both interactive and non-interactive protocols were used. In that study, it is argued that Yale 
‘elite’ students (where an interactive protocol was used) are more selfish and efficiency-oriented than ‘average’ citizens 
in the US (where a non-interactive protocol was used).20 These findings are then suggested as an explanation for the 
growing inequality in the US wealth distribution as being potentially driven by policies made by that very elite. This may 
well be true, but, as we have argued above, cannot be concluded from their data prima facie, as the game structure of the 
experiment remains unacknowledged: the role of strategic incentives, awareness, and sophistication is not controlled for, and 
this means that the more extremal decisions that characterize the Yale ‘elite’ sample compared with the ‘average’ sample 
may be a result of strategic motives as well.21 Fig. 3 illustrates the differing giving behavior of the two subject pools. In order 
to visualize decisions on the level of subjects, we create for each Subject i an extremality index φi ∈ [0, 1] (horizontal axis) 
















, where m ∈ {1, . . . , M} labels 
the decisions. Specifically, the two extremes φi = 0 and 1 respectively represent equal-splitting and extremal-giving, that is, 
zero- or full-giving in every single decision by a given Subject i. For a graphical representation on the level of individual 
decisions, see Fig. 5 in Appendix D. We caution the reader that a direct comparison with the specific equilibrium structure 
as in Theorem 1 requires some care. In order to test for GARP violations, Fisman et al. (2015b) are by design forced to vary 
endowments – an additional parameter that our model and experiment keep fixed so as to exclude endowment effects as an 
explanatory variable. Moreover, their experimental design involves considerable uncertainty. While non-trivial zero-payment 
equilibria still exist in their setting, they are perhaps less generic (cf. the generalization of Theorem 1 to settings with 
uncertainty in Appendix A.3).22 Notwithstanding, this still shows that optimal play in interactive settings is very different 
from non-interactive settings.
17 The cost issue is somewhat mitigated when experiments are conducted online, and there are some recent studies conducting non-interactive online 
experiments with samples representing the general population, see e.g. Fisman et al. (2017).
18 The two main variants of the matching protocol are as follows. Either a randomly ordered loop involving all session subjects is generated (see e.g. 
Murphy et al. 2011), or, following Andreoni and Miller (2002), participants are randomly matched under the sole restriction that no two subjects can be 
each others’ dictators (or recipients, respectively). Depending on session size, the latter typically leads to several disjoint dictator loops of varying sizes 
that are smaller than the whole session population. Loop size has no impact on Nash equilibrium predictions in Theorem 1 given narrow bracketing, but 
it does given broad bracketing. Proposition 4 in Appendix A.7 shows that, given typical experimental parameters, it is likely for a given player to be in a 
sufficiently long loop, so that zero-giving remains the (unique) Nash equilibrium.
19 Greiff et al. (2018) measure within-subject differences in Social Value Orientation (SVO) when interactive implementations are made explicit using a 
matrix formulation. A within-subject design is, however, unsuitable for our purposes since the actual game being played there is a combination of the 
non-interactive and interactive games. This results in a third, combined, game that is based on yet another set of strategic incentives, so that giving in the 
non-interactive (interactive) stage is not equivalent to giving in a stand-alone non-interactive (interactive) game.
20 The paper makes comparisons by (re-)analyzing data from an interactive Yale Law School study (Fisman et al., 2009), from an interactive Berkeley study 
(Fisman et al., 2007), and from a non-interactive American Life Panel study (Fisman et al., 2017).
21 To be clear, we make no claim here regarding whether or not elites are more selfish than the general population. In a related study (Li et al., 2017), 
where both future physicians (another ‘elite’) and average citizens were offered to give in a non-interactive setting, it was found that this elite sample made 
more selfish and efficiency-oriented decisions than the general population sample.
22 Interestingly, their data shows more extremal payments under the interactive protocol than under the non-interactive one – as would be in alignment 
with Theorem 1. Whether Nash equilibrium drives these decisions is of course speculative at this point and an ‘inverted’ control experiment with subjects 
from the same two subject pools would be required for a proper test.
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Fig. 3. Extremality of decisions of ‘elite’ versus ‘average’ in Fisman et al. 2015b. Non-interactive (ALP): Subjects are representative of the US public and 
were recruited via the American Life Panel (ALP). Giving is mostly intermediate with almost no equal-splitting and few extremal payments. Interactive 
(YLS): Subjects were students at Yale Law School (YLS). The giving pattern is extremal (and quite unusual compared with previous studies) with fewer 
intermediate payments and almost no equal-splitting. Source: authors’ own figures based on data obtained from Fisman et al. (2015b) and from the ALP, as 
per Science’s data policy.
4.2. Our experiment
Motivated by our discovery that interactive and non-interactive protocols are being used without distinction in the ex-
perimental literature (see the extended abstract (Grech and Nax, 2017)), we also set out to understand how these protocols 
matter behaviorally. We conducted a tailor-made experimental test akin to a randomized controlled trial (RCT).23 In order to 
avoid any unwanted ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ such as the possibility of ad hoc and ex post data rationalizations (Sim-
mons et al., 2011), our analysis plan (including a complete description of the hypotheses being tested and of the statistical 
procedures being used) was pre-registered with the Open Science Framework (OSF) prior to data collection. This commits 
us to perform and report on all pre-registered analyses in our paper, while labeling any additional analyses explicitly as 
exploratory.
Hypotheses
We shall focus on the following conceptual hypotheses regarding non-interactive vs. interactive dictator games.
(H0) There are no protocol differences.
(H1) Protocol differences exist
(H1.h0) . . . and can be explained by rational-choice benchmarks.24
(H1.h1) . . . and cannot be explained by rational-choice benchmarks.
We point out that testing (H0) against (H1), independently of the secondary hypotheses, tests directly for the experimen-
tal non-interchangeability of non-interactive and interactive protocols – independent of our theoretical results. Conversely, it 
is straightforward to see that regardless of the experimental outcome, interchanging protocols is hard to justify (a detailed 
theoretical discussion of the hypotheses’ implications is given in Appendix B). That is, the theoretical and experimental 
approach stand for two independent tests of the present paper’s central premise.
Experimental design
We conducted a randomized between-subject experiment, where the only treatment variation was whether an interactive 
or a non-interactive protocol was used. Our instructions were adapted from Andreoni and Miller (2002) and were identical 
23 We thank the (advisory) editors and reviewers who motivated us to pursue this direction.
24 Recall that (H1.h0) posits that non-interactive treatments induce predominantly intermediate payments, while interactive implementations are charac-
terized by extremal payments.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics. Mean and standard deviation of giving, and proportion of extremal giv-
ing by treatment, gender and self-reported bracketing (‘narrow’ means one other person is 
included in a subject’s decision-making).
All Int. Non-int. Female Narrow
Mean giving 289.3 313.3 265.4 302.1 313.3
Median giving 240 200 300 250 300
Standard deviation 269.5 268.5 268.3 270.0 259.8
Zero-giving (%) 17.8 13.2 22.5 14.9 14.8
Half-giving (%) 10.7 13.2 8.3 11.1 12.6
Full-giving (%) 4.2 4.5 3.9 4.7 3.9
Number of obs. 8’240 4’120 4’120 5’040 3’660
for both treatments (to avoid further framing effects) except for the information that was provided regarding which protocol 
(interactive or non-interactive) was being played and the fact that we kept budgets fixed in order to avoid confounds related 
to endowment effects.
As mentioned above, the experiment was fully pre-registered at the OSF before data collection. Subjects were recruited 
from our lab’s (ETH Zurich’s Decision Science Laboratory also known as DeSciL) pre-registered pool from among the gen-
eral workforce on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Those subjects signed up to the pool and are aware of the scientific 
principles of the administering laboratory (including anonymity, no deception, etc.). We opted for an online experiment to 
minimize other treatment differences such as the presence of numerous passive subjects in a laboratory. Our online subjects 
explicitly consented to participate, and, as was pre-registered, no specific set of subjects was excluded except for those who 
took part in dictator game experiments with our laboratory during the three months preceding our experiment. The exper-
iment was run as a Qualtrics study following the Operational Rules which commit the laboratory to modern experimental 
economics standards including no deception, anonymity, right of termination, etc., as confirmed by an Institutional Review 
Board Certificate of the German Association for Experimental Economic Research.25
Our experiment involved a total of 618 participating subjects. 412 subjects acted in the role of a dictator (206 per 
protocol). Another 206 subjects were randomly selected as recipients in the non-interactive protocol, directly taken to a 
short exit survey after reading the instructions, and paid without making any payout-relevant decisions.26 The experiment 
was run on November 21, 2017, between 3pm and 7pm Eastern Standard Time. Subjects recruited during that period were 
randomly allocated to one of the three possible roles: the dual dictator-and-recipient role in the interactive protocol, the 
dictator role in the non-interactive protocol, or the recipient role in the non-interactive protocol.
Each dictator took 20 decisions. Each decision involved determining how many of 1’000 tokens to keep, and how many 
to give. The 20 decisions varied with respect to the multiplier of redistribution p, which was set to values 0.1, 0.2, 0.3,..., 2.0, 
presented to each dictator in random order.27 Earnings included a fixed show-up fee of 1 USD irrespective of position, and 
a variable bonus that depended on the roles and decisions of the subjects. One decision was randomly selected per dictator 
and paid out: in the non-interactive protocol, a randomly selected recipient was paid and each recipient was matched with 
exactly one dictator; in the interactive protocol, each subject was the dictator of someone and the recipient of someone 
else. Each 200 tokens earned that way were worth 1 USD. Hence, possible bonus payments operated in the range of 0 USD 
to 15 USD, depending on role, treatment, and randomly selected payments. The experiment took between 1 minute and 
30 minutes, depending on subject and role. Actual bonus payments varied between 0 USD and 12.50 USD, with an average 
earning of 3.27 USD, which is well above standard MTurk wages.
Results
Descriptive summary statistics. Table 1 gives a descriptive summary of the experimental data.28 Overall, observed giving 
decisions in the interactive case were on average higher and resulted in less zero giving than in the non-interactive case.29
Hypotheses testing. In what follows, we provide inferential statistics for differences between the non-interactive and the 
interactive treatment. As committed in our pre-registration, we interpret findings to be significant as per the 95% confidence 
level. In addition, we refer to findings that are significant at the 90% but not at the 95% confidence level as ‘marginal’, and 
to findings that are not significant at the 90% confidence interval as ‘insignificant’.
Hypothesis (H0) is rejected: We observe significantly different giving distributions overall when comparing the two treat-
ments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p-value < 0.001, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test: p-value < 0.001), as shown in Table 3 in 
25 The Expedite Institutional Review Board Certificate Number 1 (Code RJPwvcoT), the experimental instructions and all other materials are deposited at 
osf .io /fsg52.
26 In addition, 14 subjects who were recruited as passive recipients were paid the average dictator decision, because their dictators were lost due to 
internet disconnections before any decision was taken. Hence, one session included only 6, not 20 active dictators.
27 This represents a deviation from the Andreoni and Miller (2002)-protocol which considers intersecting budget lines and is therefore forced to vary 
endowments. In order to be sure that potential differences would not be driven by endowment effects, we kept endowments fixed.
28 See also Figs. 6 and 7 in Appendix D for visualizations.
29 Further summary related to giving decisions include an average time of decision of 9.1 seconds (s.d. 16.2), and skewness and kurtosis of 0.926 and 
3.274, respectively (0.825 and 3.138 in non-interactive versus 1.048 and 3.499 in interactive).
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Fig. 4. Top: Overall Giving. Average giving, in the range π ∈ [0.2, 0.45], decreases in the multiplier of redistribution p. Error bars denote the 95% confidence 
interval corrected for between-subject differences (Cousineau et al., 2005; Morey et al., 2008). Bottom: Extremal giving. Fraction of extremal giving dis-
played in the range [0.2, 0.45], in dependence of p ∈ [0, 2]. Error bars denote the 95% confidence interval based on the Wilson score-interval for binomial 
proportions. Zero Giving: Zero giving decreases with growing p. Overall, there is more zero giving in the non-interactive protocol. Half giving: Half giving 
peaks at the standard dictator game p = 1. Full giving: The fraction of full giving is comparably low in both treatments.
Appendix C. With respect to variance levels, there are no significant protocol differences (Levene’s test: p-value = 0.928, 
Brown-Forsythe tests: p-value = 0.965). Giving is significantly higher under the interactive than under the non-interactive 
protocol, which can also be inferred from an estimated treatment effect of over twenty percent relative to the intercept in 
our exploratory OLS – see Table 4 in Appendix C, which also provides additional details concerning giving patterns with 
respect to further controls. Under both protocols, giving decreases in the multiplier of redistribution, as is illustrated in 
Fig. 4 (upper panel) and our exploratory OLS. With regards to distributional treatment differences dependent on individual 
multipliers of redistribution p, Table 3 indicates that treatment effects are predominantly significant for multipliers of redis-
tribution below 1.0 (only exception: p = 0.1). For 1.0 and above significant differences occur less frequently (no significance 
for p = 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8). We detect no significant differences in variance levels between the protocols for any level 
of p.
Hypothesis (H1.h0) is rejected: Nash equilibrium is characterized by extremal decisions, which is not confirmed by the overall 
shape of the data. This reflects the well-established fact that uninformed participants oftentimes deviate from Nash equi-
librium behavior in one-shot games (see also Footnote 8). In order to test explicitly whether extremal decisions are more 
frequent in the interactive protocol, we perform probit regressions, see Table 2 which also includes information on the focal 
point of half giving. We find significant treatment differences regarding zero-giving (more zero-giving in non-interactive). 
No significant differences are found regarding full-giving. Note also that half-giving is marginally significantly more frequent 
in the interactive protocol.
The dependency of extremal and focal giving on the multiplier of redistribution p can be summarized as follows: zero-
and half-giving decrease significantly in p in both treatments – however, with half-giving spiking notably at p = 1. There is 
no significant correlation between full-giving and p. Fig. 4, lower panel, illustrates these trends.
Robustness: The above effects relating to treatment differences regarding extremal decisions are robust with respect to the 
inclusion of additional controls. The additional effects summarize as follows. Effects regarding subjects’ age and order of 
decision-making are insignificant. Subjects’ gender is significant inasmuch as that women are less likely to give zero. There 
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Table 2
Extremal and Half-giving Decisions. Estimates of the ordered probit regressions with individual-level clustering. 
Parentheses indicate [robust standard errors] and (p-values).
(1) Zero-giving (2) Half-giving (3) Full-giving
(Reduced) (Controls) (Reduced) (Controls) (Reduced) (Controls)
Interactive −0.465∗ −0.424∗ 0.256 0.250 0.159 0.070
[0.141] [0.148] [0.189] [0.134] [0.132] [0.192]
(0.001) (0.004) (0.052) (0.061) (0.401) (0.715)
Inter.×p −0.018∗ −0.019∗ −0.034∗ −0.033∗ −0.017 −0.018
[0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010]
(0.005) (0.004) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.112) (0.092)
Non-int.×p −0.028∗ −0.031∗ −0.035∗ −0.035∗ −0.008 −0.008
[0.005] [0.006] [0.011] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011]
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.476) (0.491)
Order 0.002 −0.002 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
(0.323) (0.316) (0.230)
Female −0.303∗ 0.040 0.165
[0.131] [0.112] [0.153]
(0.021) (0.721) (0.281)
Age −0.005 0.001 −0.002
[0.006] [0.005] [0.008]
(0.442) (0.783) (0.857)
Self-centrism 0.879∗ −0.283 0.101
[0.171] [0.159] [0.252]
(<0.001) (0.075) (0.689)
Narrow bracketing −0.045 0.086 0.008
[0.151] [0.122] [0.175]
(0.767) (0.481) (0.964)
Interactive play 0.066 −0.045 0.394∗
[0.174] [0.123] [0.192]
(0.705) (0.718) (0.040)
(Cut) 0.467 0.301 1.044 1.099 1.689 1.848
[0.093] [0.278] [0.146] [0.216] [0.097] [0.339]
Log pseudolikelihood −3763.3 −3513.3 −2725.6 −2712.4 −1423.5 −1397.8
Number of obs. 8’240 8’240 8’240 8’240 8’240 8’240
Number of ind. 412 412 412 412 412 412
∗ Stands for p < 0.05.
are no other significant gender differences in terms of overall giving, full-giving, and half-giving. Belief-related controls were 
generated from subjects’ responses to questions we asked at the end of the experiment e.g. regarding how many other 
subjects they included in their considerations when making decisions. Self-centrism indicates that a subject considered only 
himself/herself. Narrow bracketing indicates that at most two other subjects were included – one recipient and one dictator. 
We find that whether subjects bracketed the decision narrowly or broadly has no significant effects, but subjects who do 
not include anyone else in their decision (‘self-centric’ bracketing) give less overall and zero more often (non-interactive 
versus interactive, respectively, we have 44.2 versus 44.7 percent narrow bracketing, and 18.9 versus 11.7 percent self-
centrism.) Finally, certain subjects stated that they operated under an interactive frame of mind (‘interactive play’), that is, 
they included others in their decision-making both in terms of that they believed to be affected by others and that oth-
ers’ decisions affected them (non-interactive versus interactive, respectively, we have 9.2 percent –incorrectly– versus 30.6 
percent –correctly– operating under ‘interactive play’). Those subjects are more likely to give everything, which is the one 
indicator that is line with Nash equilibrium benchmarks, which partially explains the overall higher giving in the interactive 
treatment. All other effects are insignificant. Assessing the robustness of our significant controls, we performed additional 
logit regressions including each control individually that had a significant effect in the probit regression including all con-
trols. The effects remain significant. The reader is referred to online material for details (cf. Footnote 25) (see also (Mäs and 
Nax, 2016) for similar regressions).
Differences with Fisman et al. (2015b). A key difference is that in neither of our treatments we observe nearly as many 
extremal decisions as in the YLS data of Fisman et al. (2015b), cf. Fig. 3 and Fig. 6. Beyond population differences between 
our two studies, other differentiating factors include the experimental design and framing. Fisman et al. (2015b) consider 
randomly generated multipliers of redistribution up to p = 10, while our maximal value is p = 2. Hence, the relatively low 
rate of full-giving in our experiment may be due to the fact that full-giving becomes an evidently efficient thing to do 
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only when subjects face higher values of p. Another striking difference between the two datasets concerns the lack of a 
peak at the Rawlsian effective equal-splitting π = 1/(1 + p) in our data, which shows a peak at equal-splitting π = 1/2
instead (compare Figs. 5 and 7 in Appendix D). This is likely driven by another difference in experimental design; while we 
–following Andreoni and Miller (2002)– explain the multiplier of redistribution p in words, Fisman et al. (2015b) graphically 
illustrate effective earnings to participants.
Discussion
As detailed when stating our hypotheses, our experimental test questions existing practices and (implicit) assumptions 
in dictator game research by construction –regardless of the outcome– due to our theoretical results. Nevertheless, we can 
learn more from our specific experimental data under additional assumptions.
The rejection of Hypothesis (H0) results from observing that giving is significantly higher under the interactive than 
under the non-interactive protocol. Thus, if we assume humans to have absolutely no strategic awareness when playing 
interactive dictator games (despite all objections given earlier), then our experimental data suggests that previous studies 
relying on interactive protocols have overestimated pro-sociality. In addition, observing no significant differences regarding 
the frequency of full giving between protocols and even significantly less zero giving under the interactive protocol leads 
to the rejection of Hypothesis (H1.h0). This implies that rational-choice benchmarks (optimal play of interacting and fully 
strategic utility-maximizers with other-regarding preferences) are not an appropriate model to describe behavior in exper-
imental interactive dictator games. Since (H0, H1.h0, H1.h1) are MECE (mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive) by 
construction, we are left with (H1.h1), that is, with the conclusion that protocol differences exist and cannot be explained 
by rational-choice benchmarks. This achieves the goal of the present paper, as stated in the Introduction.
Exploratory analysis
Future research is required to propose and test alternative behavioral theories towards better organizing the existing 
experimental data including our own: standard controls provide no satisfactory explanation.
Interactive dictator games –which have been played in economic laboratories without being analyzed for what they are–
are interesting interactions of their own and deserve further game-theoretic and experimental attention, in particular in 
relation with hybrid models of bounded rationality and altruism.30 As an outlook for what kinds of research directions 
could be taken in the future, we briefly explore two popular alternative models (one of bounded rationality, and one where 
the act of giving itself, independent of consequences, generates utility), as well as a discussion of what in our opinion is 
perhaps the most promising candidate.
Level-k reasoning. The intuition given after stating Theorem 1 can also be used to sketch what kinds of predictions models 
of cognitive hierarchy and level-k reasoning (see Camerer et al. 2004, and Crawford et al. 2013 for a review) would produce. 
Specifically, as long as each player wants others to have less than himself/herself, then such preferences would drive mutual 
giving decisions down in the interactive game compared with unilateral giving decisions in the non-interactive setting. 
However, only if players are strategically perfectly rational (k → ∞: iterative reasoning is applied ad infinitum) payments 
arrive at zero. Thus, cognitive hierarchy/level-k reasoning offers a potential explanation for the existence of intermediate 
payments under the interactive protocol. However, such theories predict that average payments from interactive treatments 
are lower than from the non-interactive treatments – which conflicts with our experimental observation of the reverse 
relation.
Warm glow. The theory of ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) posits that the act of giving itself generates utility – 
regardless of what others do. It thus seems plausible that in the presence of warm glow the zero-giving equilibrium in an 
interactive setting would disappear. And, indeed, this is the case as shown in Proposition 5 in the Appendix A.8. Hence, 
warm glow offers an alternative explanation of non-extremal payments in the interactive treatment; in the non-interactive 
case, it is not possible to distinguish pure altruism from impure altruism (warm glow) without additional controls. Crucially, 
warm glow alone, because of its independence of strategic incentives, can also not explain the observed protocol differences, 
that is, why payments in the interactive setting are higher than in the non-interactive setting.
Beliefs. Since none of the ‘standard’ behavioral models discussed above was able to organize the data satisfactorily, we 
conducted a secondary study – exploratory rather than falsificatory in nature. Under various interactive treatments, a total 
of 522 subjects played a single dictator game each (with p = 1) and reported a belief concerning what they expected others’ 
giving decisions to be in the same game, see Table 5 and Wehrli (2018) for experimental details. Treatments varied with 
respect to the lengths of the ‘loops’ that subjects belonged to, and we used the protocol variation to identify whether 
belief effects (for which interactive protocols as used in the literature do not control) have significant traces.31 Indeed, we 
find that between 38 and 56 percent of the subjects give amounts exactly equal to their beliefs. This makes the alternative 
explanation plausible that a substantial part of the observed heterogeneity of giving decisions in interactive protocols, which 
thus far has been interpreted as heterogeneity in other-regarding preferences, stems instead from simpler (equality-oriented) 
30 While we should certainly not avoid interactive dictator games altogether in the future, we should think about the interest they may have in their own 
right because they might be closer to several ‘real world’ giving situations than the non-interactive dictator games with which those have been studied 
thus far; see also Footnote 3.
31 We considered loop lengths of 2, 3, 5 or involving the entire session (recruited to be 50).
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heuristics with giving heterogeneity driven by belief heterogeneity.32 Beyond beliefs about others’ giving behavior as a basis 
for best response, beliefs could also be essential for the understanding of how –descriptive or injunctive– norms govern 
behavior. Whether those can explain behavior (see e.g. Krupka and Weber, 2013 for an elicitation method relevant to our 
setting) is a promising avenue for future research. Certainly, more appropriate controls for the role of beliefs in interactive 
protocols are needed.
In sum, none of the models that are frequently used in this field of research can organize the data of our experiment, 
or indeed of prior experimental studies: Nash equilibrium predictions relying on common other-regarding preference mod-
els (CES, Fehr-Schmidt, Bolton-Ockenfels, Charness-Rabin) are way off; warm-glow giving cannot account for the observed 
protocol effects; cognitive hierarchy/level-k reasoning, if anything, suggest effects in the opposite directions. Future ex-
perimental and theoretical work is needed to organize the larger body of existing data (including ours). The inclusion of 
auxiliary controls such as concerning strategic sophistication and awareness, as well as for beliefs regarding others’ giving 
propensities and norm perceptions might turn out to be important in that effort.
5. Conclusion
Reciprocal motivations where beliefs matter are the key constituents of many models used in behavioral economics.33
Even so, the extensive experimental literature concerned with other-regarding preference estimation has not considered 
them – despite the fact that the actual games being played in many of these studies are interactive dictator games, where 
giving and receiving go hand in hand. From a game-theoretic perspective, those games are more similar to voluntary con-
tribution games than to non-interactive dictator games.34 Yet, studies based on interactive dictator games pursue a line 
of analysis as if the underlying decision context featured no strategic interaction whatsoever. The present paper makes an 
explicit comparison of non-interactive and interactive protocols both in terms of theory foundations and by means of ex-
perimental tests that are designed to falsify. Both lines of investigation find complementary evidence showing that the two 
protocols should not be used interchangeably.35
Specifically, our theoretical analysis of interactive dictator games has shown that under standard rationality assump-
tions, Nash equilibria can even feature extremal payments for all preference types – in our specific model, this happens 
generically. In particular, even for substantially altruistic players, the equilibrium can be zero giving. This stands in stark 
contrast to non-interactive dictator games where rational players would make intermediate payments (unless narrowly self-
interested/selfless). Based purely on data of giving decisions without further controls regarding strategic awareness and 
beliefs about others’ decisions, it is thus impossible to disentangle strategic sophistication from other-regarding preferences 
in an interactive settings: this can even mean that if someone makes consistent non-zero payments, then we are able to 
conclude that he/she is not completely selfish, but we cannot positively deduce how altruistic he/she is as we do not know 
his/her beliefs and cannot control for his/her level of strategic reasoning. If, instead, the observed payments are consistently 
zero, then we cannot know whether this is the result of pure selfishness or of full rationality (with perhaps substantial 
altruism). Thus, our theory results alone reveal a fundamental problem regarding the way interactive dictator games are 
usually interpreted in preferences estimation studies.
To complement our theoretical investigation, we conducted a pre-registered experiment to isolate the protocol differ-
ence behaviorally, using the original Andreoni and Miller (2002) framework with minimal modifications required for proper 
testing. The purpose of the experiment was a pre-registered ‘clean’ test of the protocol effect, and its results have revealed 
a significant difference in giving decisions between non-interactive and interactive protocols, thereby rejecting the inter-
changeability of non-interactive and interactive protocols also from an experimental perspective. More precisely, even under 
the –in our view implausible36– assumption that players have no strategic awareness or sophistication, our experimental 
results would still indicate a significant bias when using an interactive protocol instead of a non-interactive one. What is 
more, giving decisions in the interactive setting did not follow pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: in particular, intermediate 
giving continued to dominate, thereby adding serious attenuation to the assertion of ‘rational’ altruism in such settings. 
Other commonly used candidate explanations (warm glow, cognitive hierarchy) could not organize the data either. Explor-
ing the data further and running additional experiments, we find that without additional auxiliary variables (measures of 
strategic sophistication and awareness) and controls (concerning beliefs regarding others’ giving) behavior in interactive 
dictator games cannot satisfactorily be explained.
One is left wondering ‘So what do we really learn from dictator game experiments?’. One thing that all dictator game 
experiments (including this study) have done time and again (regardless of the underlying protocol) is falsifying the ex-
32 Further work is needed to disentangle this hypothesis from an alternative hypothesis according to which beliefs might not be truthfully reported but 
rather stated so as to ‘justify’ giving decisions.
33 Reciprocity is crucial, for example, in many models of other-regarding preferences (Sobel, 2005) and in public goods games (Chaudhuri, 2011). The 
strategy method is one of the many techniques that is used to spell this out, and could be used in interactive dictator games in the future.
34 Grech (2019) makes this connection explicit.
35 A third variant of the dictator game that is often implemented –yet not analyzed here– is one where there is not actually any role duality, but instead 
uncertainty regarding whose decisions are implemented in the dictator’s role. In a modified dictator game (including actions of surplus destruction) Iriberri 
and Rey-Biel (2011) find dramatic treatment differences.
36 Note that in our experiment 43% of participants in the interactive setting indicated to have both understood and included the strategic nature of the 
game in their decision-making.
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treme view that humans are narrowly self-interested all the time.37 Yet, while falsification is one of the principal aims of 
experimentation –indeed the main aim of our own experiment– the hope is of course that we will be able to learn more 
from them than that in the future. Our study indicates that whether or not one is able to do so critically depends on 
seemingly subtle details of the experimental design – a general observation that other authors have mentioned before (see 
e.g. Levitt and List 2007). The specific case considered here is special in that it goes beyond the usual critique regarding 
framing effects: we find that an entirely different game is often implemented. Thus, the quote by Forsythe et al. at the 
beginning of this paper may be true in theory, but in practice the ‘non-game’ feature of the actual dictator game is given up 
in many experimental implementations. Social preference measurements obtained in such a way are therefore confounded, 
since beliefs and interactive considerations enter in hitherto uncontrolled ways, and valid alternative interpretations exist. 
We believe this to be a sensitive issue, as the other-regarding preference estimation literature is oftentimes concerned with 
value-laden differences among humans based on factors such as social class, gender, generation, nationality, etc. (see Foot-
note 4). Our hope with the present paper is to initiate and contribute to the development of better tools to control for 
potential confounds when conclusions of high societal relevance are at stake.
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Appendix A. Proofs and additional mathematical results
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Best replies. From Eqs. ((5),(6)) (πi being shorthand for BRi(π−i)), we compute







1− π j + pπ j−1
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What remains is to check the extremal cases that were excluded by (5). As mentioned in Subsection 3.2, these are in fact 
(almost) covered by (10).
Perfect egoist. If ci = 0, then ui(πi, π−i) = 1 − πi + pπ−i , so that BRi(π−i) ≡ 0 regardless of ρi ; this case is absorbed by 
allowing for ai = ∞.
37 Oechssler (2010) goes as far as suggesting that this conclusions is indeed all that can be learned from dictator games.
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1− π j + pπ j−1
)
, so that BRi(π−i) ≡ 1 regardless of ρi ; this case is 
absorbed by allowing for ai = 0.
Rawlsian. If ρi → −∞, we obtain a Leontief utility function ui(π1, . . . , πN ) = min{oi, si} and hence Player i strives for equal-
ity, i.e. si = oi ; consistent with ai = 1, cf. Equation (6).
Efficiency optimizer. If ρi = 1, we distinguish three subcases:
(a) If w(i)
i+1pci > (1 − ci), Player i’s best reply is BRi(π−i) ≡ 1, corresponding to ai = 0.
(b) If w(i)
i+1pci < (1− ci), we have BRi(π−i) ≡ 0 which amounts to setting ai = ∞.
(c) If w(i)i+1pci = (1 − ci), Player i’s utility is independent of his/her own payment, and thus any payment is a best reply. 
This is the only case that is not absorbed by a particular value of ai and hence neither by Equation (10).
Proof of Item 1. If ρi = 1 and w
(i)
i+1pci = (1− ci), then any payment may be a best reply, in particular πi = 1. For 
(π∗1 , . . . , π
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i+1 + p(1− ai)
)
, and hence the claim fol-
lows from 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1.
Proof of Item 2. It is clear that (π∗1 , . . . , π
∗
N ) = (0, . . . , 0) is an equilibrium, because if π j = 0 for all j = i, then all we need 






(1− ai) ≤ 0,
which holds by the assumption 1 ≤ ai . ✷
A.2. Theorem 1 with arbitrary budgets and multipliers
If we allow players to have different budgets (endowments) bi > 0 and multipliers of redistribution pi > 0 (i = 1, . . . , N), 
Equation (3) generalizes to
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A.3. Theorem 1 with uncertainty
Interactive implementations feature various degrees of uncertainty regarding the other player(s), as e.g. in Fisman et al. 
(2015b). These include incomplete information regarding preference types as well as regarding the budgets and multipliers 
of redistribution for other players. In this section we sketch how Theorem 1 translates to such settings. While we make no 
attempt at giving a full-fledged equilibrium analysis for the most general game here (as this would fill another paper and 
likely result in many different equilibria), we use this section to identify circumstances in which one can make use of the 
particular structure of the Equilibrium Conditions (11): it turns out that sizeable ranges of parameters can be pooled and 
lead to identical equilibria – closely connected to the bang-bang structure in Theorem 1. We use this fact to allow for the 
different types of uncertainty mentioned above ‘as long as parameters stay within their pooling ranges’. We first introduce 
the shorthand notation for preference types,
ti := (ci,ρi, {w
(i)
j
} j =i) ∈ [0,1] × (−∞,1] × 
N−2 := T ,
(N−2 being the N − 2 dimensional standard simplex in RN−1) and allow for uncertainty expressed by a conditional 
distribution f i(t−i, p−i, b−i) regarding preference types ti ∈ T , multipliers of redistribution pi ∈ [pmin, pmax] =: P and bud-
gets bi ∈ [bmin, bmax] =: B for each Player i. Note that the game parameters pi, bi in this experimental context are drawn 
from a commonly known distribution with density h. By contrast, the ti are a priori determined by subjective beliefs, i.e. 
f i(t−i, p−i, b−i) = gi(t−i)h(p−i, b−i).
Each Player i then chooses a strategy π∗i (xi), where xi := (ti, pi, bi) is his/her full type. His/her expected utility satisfies
Eui(π
∗




1 (·), . . . ,π
∗





















1 (x1), . . . ,π
∗
N(xN )) f i(x−i)d
n−1x−i, (13)
for every i = 1, . . . , N , where πi ∈ [0, bi], and xi ∈ T × P × B . In general, choosing the best-responding strategy π∗i (xi)
constitutes a difficult optimization problem. However, extremal payments for all players and thus extremal equilibria survive 
under the following assumptions on the distribution f i(x−i) and in particular on the subjective beliefs gi(t−i). Namely, as 
long as everybody satisfies Condition (11) (Condition (12)) and in addition believes that this condition is satisfied for all i
(i.e. other parameter configurations have weight zero), zero-giving (full-giving) is an equilibrium, in the sense that there are 
no profitable deviations from π∗
i
(xi) ≡ 0 for all i.38 Indeed, in this case, we have for all such types
∫
T N−1×PN−1×BN−1















ui(0, . . . ,0) f i(x−i)d
n−1x−i
(and similarly for full-giving). Thus, zero-giving (full-giving) is still an equilibrium despite considerable uncertainty in the 
game.39
38 In case of a common prior regarding preference types ti , this corresponds to the textbook definition of a Bayesian equilibrium. Note however, that 
common priors regarding the preference types ti are not necessary to fulfill Condition (11).
39 Bayesian equilibrium conditions represent a consistency check (similarly as for Nash equilibrium), which is why only first-order beliefs entered in our 
derivation. Higher-order beliefs, as for instance would be specified in case of common knowledge of (11) or (12), are needed to determine whether rational 
play resembles Bayesian equilibrium.
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for all i = 1, . . . ,N. (14)














giving is an equilibrium.







being the maximally 
obtainable value of i’s recipient) with the additional restriction that if bi ≤ 50, then b
(i+1)
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, if ρi ≥ 0,
100ρi−1101−ρi = 1
101−ρi
if ρi < 0,
for all i = 1, . . . ,N.













for all i = 1, . . . ,N, (15)
which is admittedly less generic40 but once again shows that interactive dictator games are very different from non-
interactive ones in terms of rational-choice benchmarks.
A.4. Zero-giving under alternative other-regarding preferences
In this subsection, we briefly sketch how zero-giving equilibria arise in interactive 2-player dictator games under alter-
native other-regarding preference specifications. Several of these results readily generalize to N > 2-player dictator games 
for appropriate bracketing assumptions and preferences.
Let πi denote player i’s material payoff, and π−i that of the other player. We consider the following preference models 
for player i.
Fehr-Schmidt (1999). The 2-player utility function reads
ui(πi,π−i) =
{
si − αi(oi − si); if oi ≥ si
si − βi(si − oi); if si > oi .
=
{
1− (1+ αi(1+ p))πi + (p + αi(1+ p))π−i; if πi ≥ π−i
1− (1+ βi(1+ p))π−i + (p + βi(1+ p))πi; if π−i > πi
where βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1 parametrize the individual’s inequity aversion. Without loss of generality we can assume that 
πi ≥ π−i . But then πi = 0 is the best reply for Player i and hence
40 Note however that under broad bracketing with, say 51 subjects, Condition (15) becomes somewhat more realistic, namely ci ≤ 13 for all i.
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u−i(π−i,πi) = 1− (1+ α−i(1+ p))π−i
from which it follows that π−i = 0 is indeed the best reply for the other player and hence (π∗1 , π
∗
2 ) = (0, 0) is the unique 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Bolton-Ockenfels (2000). The 2-player utility function reads








1− πi + pπ−i,
1− πi + pπ−i
2+ (p − 1)(πi + π−i)
)













≤ 0 (narrow self-interest)








< 0. (comparative effect)



























> 0, the right hand side of Equation (16) would be strictly negative and hence πi = 0 would 
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vanishes identically, that 







−i is then an equilibrium.
Charness-Rabin (2002). The 2-player utility function reads41
ui(πi,π−i) =
{
(1− σi)si + σioi; if oi ≥ si
(1− ρi)si + ρioi; if si > oi
=
{
1+ (pσi − (1 − σi))πi + (p(1 − σi) − σi)π−i; if πi ≥ π−i
1+ (pρi − (1− ρi))πi + (p(1− ρi) − ρi)π−i; if π−i > πi
where ρ ≥ σ parametrize concerns for self and aggregated payoffs. Without loss of generality we may assume that πi ≥ π−i
so that
ui(πi,π−i) = 1+ (pσi − (1− σi))πi + (p(1 − σi) − σi)π−i .
Then πi = 0 is a best reply if and only if pσi < 1 −σi or, equivalently, σi < 1/(1 + p), regardless of the value of ρi . Intuitively, 
this requires that a player must be sufficiently selfish if his/her opponent obtains at least as a high a payoff. If both players 
satisfy this condition, the unique equilibrium is (π∗i , π
∗
−i) = (0, 0).
41 Note that we focus on the outcome-oriented part of the utility and omit the reciprocity component here due to the one-shot nature of our situation.
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A.5. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Item 1: narrow bracketing. We argue by contradiction and assume that π∗i0 < 1 is the lowest of all payments. Using 





























1+ pai0 − p − ai0
)
≥ 1− ai0 > 0.
Using 1 + pai0 − p − ai0 = (1 − p)(1 − ai0 ) and ai0 < 1 this inequality simplifies to
π∗i0(1 − p) ≥ 1, (17)
which is impossible given π∗
i0
< 1 and p > 0.
Proof of Item 1: broad bracketing. We argue by contradiction and distinguish two cases.
Case 1 (p ≥ 1). Let π∗
i1−1
be the highest of all payments and assume that π∗
i1−1
< 1. It follows that π∗
i1












































This can be rewritten as


















and since ai1−1 < 1 we obtain 1 ≤ (1 − p)π
∗
i1−1
, a contradiction; thus π∗
i1−1
= 1. Assume that π∗
i1
< 1 holds, given that 
π∗
i1−1
= 1, we obtain










ai1(p − 1)(N − 2)
N − 1
]
which simplifies to ai1 > 1, contradicting the assumption. Proceeding through the entire loop of players, we see that 
(π∗1 , . . . , π
∗
N ) = (1, . . . , 1) is indeed the only possible equilibrium.
Case 2 (0 < p < 1). Let π∗
i2
be the lowest of all payments. If π∗
i2







































and thus 1 ≤ (1 − p)π∗
i2
by the same reasoning as in Case 1 above. This however contradicts p < 1 and hence π∗
i2
= 1. By 
the minimality of π∗
i2
, it follows that π∗
i
= 1 for all i.
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> 0 and show that this 

























Using ai3 > 1 and the same transformations as in the proof of Item 1 we arrive again (cf. Inequality (17)) at
π∗i3(1− p) ≥ 1,
which contradicts the assumption p > 0.
Proof of Item 2: broad bracketing. We argue by contradiction and distinguish again two cases.
Case 1 (p ≥ 1). We assume that there is an equilibrium with at least one player, say i4 , such that π∗i4 > 0. We first show that 
it then holds that π∗i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N . To see why that is, note that then Player i4 ’s best reply in equilibrium, see 
Equation (10), implies

















π∗j ≥ 0. Applying this argument recursively shows 
that indeed π∗i > 0 for all i. It follows that if at least one player satisfies π
∗
i = 0 then there is nothing to show. We therefore 
assume without loss of generality that π∗i4−1 > 0 is the lowest of all payments. Since then π
∗
i4











































Using ai4 > 1 this simplifies to, cf. Equation (18),
1 ≤ (1 − p)π∗i4−1.
This, however, is impossible as p > 0 and 0 ≤ π∗
i4−1
≤ 1.
Case 2 (0 < p < 1). We argue again by contradiction. Let π∗
i5
be the maximum of all payments. If π∗
i5
= 0, there is nothing to 
show. If π∗
i5







































which, cf. Equation (18) again, is equivalent to 1 ≤ (1 − p)π∗
i5
and thus we get again a contradiction. ✷
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3

























assuming the same provisions for the ai as in the N-player case.
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Proof of Item 1. We first show that for aia−i = 1, all pure Nash equilibria are located on the boundary of the unit square. 
Suppose not, i.e. 0 < πi < 1 for i = 1, 2. Then the formula for best replies yields the fixed point condition for an interior 
equilibrium,
(
1+ pai −(ai + p)













If p = 1 the determinant of the matrix on the left hand side is non-zero,
(1+ pai)(1 + pa−i) − (ai + p)(a−i + p) = (p
2 − 1)(aia−i − 1) = 0,






, which does not lie on the 

























⇔ aia−i = 1,
and thus we arrive again at a contradiction.
We now construct the Nash equilibria on the boundary of [0, 1]2 under the condition aia−i = 1. Since the conditions for 
Item 1.i and 1.iii are slightly relaxed compared to those in Theorem 2, we give a separate proof here. However, we restrict 
ourselves to Items 1.i and 1.ii in Theorem 3. Items 1.iii and 1.iv are proved analogously.
Item 1.i (aia−i > 1 and a−i, ai ≥ 1). If π∗−i = 0 then BRi(0) = 0 because ai ≥ 1. Since moreover BR−i(0) = 0 due to a−i ≥ 1




) = (0, 0) is indeed an equilibrium. If π∗
−i
= 1, then BRi(1) =
1+p
1+pai










⇔ a−i + paia−i ≤ a−i + p
⇔ aia−i ≤ 1, (22)




) = (0, 0) is the only Nash equilibrium where π∗
−i
∈ {0, 1}, and by symmetry it is in fact the 
only equilibrium.
Item 1.ii (aia−i > 1 and a−i > 1 > ai). If π∗−i = 0 then BRi(0) =
1−ai
1+pai
because ai < 1. Moreover, BR−i(
1−ai
1+pai






⇔ 1 ≤ aia−i




) = ( 1−ai
1+pai
, 0) is indeed an equilibrium. There are no other equilibria:
(a) If π∗
−i
= 1, then BRi(1) = 1 because ai < 1; yet BR−i(1) =
1+p
1+pa−i
< 1 since a−i > 1, a contradiction.
(b) If π∗
i
= 0, then BR−i(0) = 0 because a−i > 1; yet BRi(0) =
1−ai
1+pai
> 0 since ai < 1, a contradiction.
(c) If π∗
i
= 1 then BR−i(1) =
1+p
1+pa−i
< 1 because a−i > 1; yet BRi(
1+p
1+pa−i
) < 1: to see this, assume BRi(
1+p
1+pa−i






which is equivalent to 1 ≥ aia−i , a contradiction.
Proof of Item 2. Now let aia−i = 1 and without loss of generality a−i ≥ 1 ≥ ai . We start by determining the Nash equilibria 
on the boundary. To that end, let us first look at the case a−i = ai = 1. With the same arguments used to prove Item 1.i








) = (1, 1) are the only 
equilibria on the boundary of [0, 1]2 . Second, we consider the case a−i > 1 > ai , and apply the arguments used to prove 
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) = ( 1−ai
1+pai
, 0) is the only 
equilibrium with π∗
−i




) = (1, 1+p
1+pa−i
) is the only equilibrium with π∗
i
∈ {0, 1}. Finally, we turn to interior 
Nash equilibria. Multiplying the second line of (20) by −ai , using aia−i = 1 we obtain
(
1+ pai −(ai + p)


































Note that we recover the above determined boundary solution for extremal values of t .
Proof of Item 3. This follows from the fact that BRi(π−i) ≡ 1 and BR−i(πi) ≡ 0 in this case.
Proof of Item 4. This follows directly from the fact the Player i’s utility is independent of πi if ρi = 1 and that ci p =
1 − ci . ✷
A.7. Probability of being in a loop of given size
With the following proposition, we can show that the loop size requirement for a zero-giving equilibrium under broad 
bracketing, as given implicitly by Condition (9), holds with high probability in a typical experimental session.
Proposition 4. Assume that M ≥ 2 players are randomly matched in such a manner that every player is a dictator of exactly one 
player and a recipient of exactly one player. All matches between players are equally probable and subject to the constraint that every 
so created loop of players has at least size L. Then, the probability that a given player is in a loop with more than N0 players is given by
P (M, L,N0) =
M − N0
M − L + 1
.
Usually, the multiplier of redistribution satisfies p ≤ 4 and other-regarding concerns are bounded by the social norm 







+ 1 = 5 =: N0.
A typical experimental session involves about M ≥ 20 subjects. In addition, it is usually not allowed for two participants 
to be each others’ dictators and recipients at the same time, that is, L = 3. Thus, using Proposition 4, the probability for a 
given player to be in such a loop of zero giving is substantial, namely at least
P (M, L,N0) =
M − N0





Proof of Proposition 4. Let AN0 be the event that a given Player i
∗ is in a loop of size bigger than N0 (≥ L) and let Bk
denote the event that Player i∗ is not in a loop of length k. The probability of AN is given by



































M − L + 1
,
where the first equality holds since loops of length smaller than L are excluded, and the second because of the chain 
rule.
As for the third equality, it helps to think of the network structure being created by successively adding directed links 
between players, starting with Player i∗ , until every player has exactly one inward and one outward going link. Assuming 
that Player i∗ is not in any loop of size l ≤ k − 1, he/she will eventually be the starting point of a directed chain of length 
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k − 1 in this network creation process. The probability that this chain will not reconnect to a loop equals the probability 

















M − k + 1
.
The fourth equality above is obtained by omitting equal numerators and denominators in the product. ✷
A.8. Interactive dictator games in presence of warm glow
Here, we prove the absence of zero-giving in equilibrium for interactive dictator games if players’ preferences include a 
























where ci, di denote Player i’s concern for self and other respectively as before, and gi measures ‘warm glow’, assuming that 





















Proposition 5. In the interactive dictator game, (π1, . . . , πN ) = (0, . . . , 0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium if at least one of the players 




i (πi,0, . . . ,0) =
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If gi > 0, then this last expression is positive (in fact, infinitely large) for πi ց 0 since ρi < 1. Consequently, πi = 0 cannot 
be a best reply to π−i = (0, . . . , 0), which proves the claim for ρi = 0. The proof in the Cobb-Douglas case follows along the 
same lines. ✷
Appendix B. Theoretical implications of experimental hypotheses
Our three hypotheses (H0), (H1.h0), (H1.h1) are MECE. Here, we discuss the logical consequences of all potential outcomes 
of our test procedure in detail.
Case 1: Cannot reject (H0). Protocol differences are not significant, implications are inconclusive in a Popperian sense as 
nothing is falsified and we stop testing.
Notwithstanding, if we were to interpret this outcome to mean that no protocol differences exist, two causes are possible. 
Either subjects could in fact show different behavior under the two protocols on an individual basis which simply does not 
show in the (identical) overall distributions. As per definition of this possibility, preference estimation techniques would 
then be inapplicable.43 Alternatively, each individual subject might indeed make identical decisions under both protocols, 
because he/she perceives the interactive protocol like the non-interactive one. Preference estimation would then a priori be 
valid even under an interactive design.
However, only two underlying reasons for such strategic unawareness are conceivable, both of which are problematic. 
For one, it could be that it is a general trait of humans playing dictator games. This conclusion would hint at a model of 
an economic agent incapable of any ‘cognitive empathy’ (as mentioned in the Introduction) – a concept, that would conflict 
42 In the special case of an efficiency optimizer (ρi = 1), this condition has to be modified to gi > di − ci pw(i)i+1 instead.
43 Even with alternative experimental designs it is however difficult, if not impossible, to investigate the specifics of such an individual difference in 
behavior (see Footnote 19).
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with a large body of research in behavioral game theory, which shows that most subjects are (at least boundedly) able to 
reason strategically in almost all other experimental games. The other reason would be that strategic unawareness is the 
result of instructions ‘framing’ otherwise strategic subjects in a way that clouds the actual rules of interactive dictator games 
– this, alas, would not constitute best practice in experimental economics, because we, as analysts of these games, could 
never be confident to what extent this framing was successful for all or some of the subjects.44
Case 2: Reject (H0). Protocol differences are significant, and we can conclude that strategic incentives have an effect.
This could be a consequence of strategic reasoning by individuals in a game-theoretic sense – in which case non-
interactive preference estimation would be inappropriate and in many cases even ambiguous by virtue of our theoretical 
results, even if subjects are not perfectly strategic.45 Alternatively, again upholding the extreme assumption that subjects 
are strategically entirely unaware, the rejection of (H0) might result from a some different (stochastic, socio-psychologic, 
etc.) unknown effect, in which case interactive preference estimation would a priori still be applicable. However, in addition 
to the problems mentioned above (in the case where we cannot reject (H0)), such measurements would also be subject to 
a significant bias compared to a standard non-interactive preference estimation.
In case of rejection of (H0), we have two cases.
Case 2.1: Cannot reject (H0.h0). Rational-choice benchmarks may serve as functioning behavioral theory explaining giving in 
interactive dictator games – again only in the Popperian sense that our experiment gives no reason for rejection.
Case 2.2: Reject (H0.h0). Observed differences deviate substantially from rational-choice benchmarks implying that those do 
not explain behavior in the interactive dictator game that we implemented.
In conclusion, even before collecting any experimental data, the above scenario analysis –based on the inextricableness 
of other-regarding motives and strategic considerations that was discovered on pure theoretical grounds– suggests that 
existing studies that are based on interactive protocols cannot exclude strategic confounds that may have altered their 
conclusions.
Appendix C. Additional statistical analyses and data
Table 3
p-Values of Non-parametric Tests for All Multipliers of Redistribution. We report the p-values of tests re-
garding all decisions, averages, and p-dependent decisions; Specifically, for differences in distribution using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) tests, and for equality of variance using 
Levene and Brown-Forsythe (BF) (two-sided) tests. Stars indicate significance at the 95% confidence level. Grey-
shaded p-values for MWW, Levene and BF highlight that KS indicated significant distributional differences.
Price of redistr. (p) KS MWW Levene BF N. Obs.
All < 0.001∗ <0.001∗ 0.928 0.965 8’240
Average 0.055 < 0.001∗ 0.380 0.757 412
0.1 0.082 0.072 0.586 0.651 412
0.2 0.016∗ 0.007∗ 0.546 0.716 412
0.3 0.024∗ 0.009∗ 0.946 0.879 412
0.4 0.016∗ 0.007∗ 0.559 0.642 412
0.5 0.082 0.045∗ 0.775 0.915 412
0.6 0.016∗ 0.003∗ 0.621 0.606 412
0.7 0.024∗ 0.002∗ 0.738 0.895 412
0.8 0.038∗ 0.021∗ 0.968 0.768 412
0.9 0.038∗ 0.012∗ 0.692 0.669 412
1.0 0.163 0.064 0.216 0.364 412
1.1 0.055 0.017∗ 0.865 0.809 412
1.2 0.191 0.068 0.722 0.990 412
1.3 0.006∗ 0.002∗ 0.824 0.565 412
1.4 0.299 0.145 0.324 0.499 412
1.5 0.266 0.040∗ 0.804 0.907 412
1.6 0.096 0.051 0.319 0.302 412
1.7 0.122 0.026∗ 0.766 0.638 412
1.8 0.221 0.068 0.805 0.964 412
1.9 0.116 0.026∗ 0.538 0.521 412
2.0 0.144 0.032∗ 0.434 0.332 412
∗ Stands for p < 0.05.
44 Recall that Case 1 is suggested by the findings of Korenok et al. (2013).
45 Implications of k-level reasoning will be sketched below in the discussion of our experimental results.
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Table 4
OLS of Giving Decisions (Exploratory Regression). Estimates of OLS regres-


































Root MSE 266.7 263.2
Number observations 8’240 8’240
Number individuals 412 412
∗ Stands for p < 0.05.
Table 5
Percentage of Giving Corresponding 1-1 with Beliefs Concerning Others’ Giving.
Loop size Percentage of 1-1 
correspondences
Observations Instructions
2 56% 100 You will be paired with another participant of this study. You split a dollar. The 
other receives what you transfer. The other also splits a dollar, and you receive what 
the other transfers to you.
3 38% 108 You will be paired with two other participants of this study. The three of you will 
form a ring. Each of you splits a dollar. Your next neighbor to the right receives 
what you transfer. Your neighbor to the left receives what your neighbor to the 
right transfers. You receive what your neighbor to the left has transferred.
5 43% 105 You will be paired with four other participants of this study. The five of you will 
form a ring. Each of you splits a dollar. Your next neighbor to the right receives 
what you transfer. And so it continues along the ring. You receive what your 
neighbor to the left has transferred.
entire sessiona 40% 209 You split a dollar. The amount shared by you will be transferred to a randomly 
paired MTurk worker who also participates in this study. Note that all participants 
face the same decision, and that you will be the recipient of another randomly 
paired MTurk worker who participates in this study. Hence, on top of what you 
keep for yourself, you will receive what that other person transfers to you. The two 
MTurk workers you are paired with are not the same.
aLoop size ‘entire session’: 5 sessions recruited with a target of 50, with final session only attracting 9 hits. Data is taken from Wehrli (2018).
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Appendix D. Additional figures
Fig. 5. Giving in Fisman et al. (2015b) – Relative Payment Frequencies for p ∈ [0.1, 10] for ‘elite’ vs ‘average’ samples. Non-interactive (ALP): Subjects are 
representative of the US public and were recruited via the American Life Panel (ALP). The giving patterns resemble those from many previous studies. Many 
intermediate payments above effective equal-splitting are observed, almost no zero payments, and two spikes at full-transfer and effective equal-splitting 
(Rawlsian: pπi = 1 −πi ). Interactive (YLS): Subjects were students at Yale Law School (YLS). The giving pattern is extremal and quite unusual compared with 
previous studies. Fewer intermediate payments above and below effective equal-splitting are observed, less mass at effective equal-splitting, and two spikes 
at zero and full payments. The mass at zero is decreasing in p, while the mass at everything is increasing in p (note that this latter mass is particularly 
high compared with the vast majority of prior studies, particularly for high p). Source: authors’ own figures based on data obtained from Fisman et al. 
(2015b) and from the ALP, as per Science’s data policy.
Fig. 6. Extremality of decisions for the interactive and non-interactive protocols. We use the same extremality index as in Fig. 3 (with equal-splitting 
at 0, and zero-/full-giving at 1).
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Fig. 7. Giving in our Experiment – Relative Payment Frequencies for p ∈ [0.1, 2] (note that this range differs from the one in Fig. 5). Non-interactive: We 
observe many intermediate payments, mostly below half, and two spikes at zero-transfer and equal-splitting. Giving decreases in p. Interactive: We observe 
fewer zero-payments, more equal-splitting. The mass at zero is decreasing in p.
Appendix E. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .geb .2019 .10 .004.
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